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Abstract: In my paper, I talk about the reasons why paramilitary groups form while listing 
examples of groups for each factor. I go over items such as vigilantism and I bring up examples 
of groups in South Africa, such the People Against Gangsterism and Drugs who originally was a 
political group who staged protests and marches asking the police and government to do 
something about the gangs which were taking over the community. They later morphed in a 
vigilante group who began bombing and assassinating drug lords. Ideology is another item I 
bring up and I use the IRA as an example. They were a group who wanted to unite Ireland under 
one rule and get the British out. That attracted lots of members. I then examine power vacuums 
that can lead to paramilitary groups forming to take control of an area. For this I examine 
Columbia’s history of paramilitary groups and their impacts. My final item I bring up is why 
governments tolerate such violent groups at times and the impacts of leaving such groups 






  “The  Cause  and  Effect  of  Paramilitary  Groups”  
Ryan  Hill  
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A  core  concern  in  the  modern  age  has  been  about  the  government’s  ability  to  provide  
physical  protection  to  the  populace.  What  happens  though   when  people  perceive  a  failure?  
Paramilitary  groups  have  often  formed  because  of  a  government  failing  to  protect  their  people 
from  a  perceived  threat,  such  groups  include  the  United  Self  Defense  Forces  of  Columbia  who  
formed  in  response  to  relentless  attacks  and  extortion  perpetrated  by  the  Revolutionary  Armed  
Forces  of  Colombia .   
The  definition  of  a  paramilitary  group  is  a  semi-militarized  force  whose  organizational  
structure,  tactics,  training,  subculture,  and  (often)  function  are  similar  to  those  of  a  professional  
military ,  but  which  is  not  included  as  part  of  a  state's  formal  armed  forces .  Now  according  to  
some  definitions,  the  police  and  border  security  forces  are  defined  under  “paramilitary  
organizations,”  since  they  receive  military-like  training  and  act  like  an  elite  force,  however  they  
work  for  the  government;  which  means  they  have  to  follow  laws  and  have  restrictions  that  are  
placed  upon  them  by  the  government,  and  they  receive  state  funding.  The  groups  I  shall  be  
focusing  on  are  the  unofficial  forces.  They  are  groups  who  form  do  to  fear,  ideology,  or  even  a  
power  vacuum.  These  are  groups  who  act  outside  the  government’s  power,  have  different  
ideologies,  and  have  their  own  set  of  interests.  Their  interests  may  be  either  similar  or  
contradictory  to  the  government's  stance  on  issues,  but  they  all  have  different  ways  of  achieving  
them.  There  are  times  where  governments  and  people  decide  to  tolerate  their  actions  if  they  are  






simply  because  they  are  fighting  the  same  group  the  government  is.  Even  tolerating  vigilante  
groups  can  be  the  start  of  problems  down  the  road.  
Paramilitary  groups  are  often  formed  due  to  fear  fueled  by  vigilantism.  During  the   1990s  
the  African  National  Congress  had  just  recently  been  legalized  by  the  president  of  South  Africa,  
this  was  a  way  of  easing  relations  between  the  Afrikaners  and  the  black  population.  
Unfortunately,  it  encouraged  the  formation  of  a  group  known  as  Blanke  Veiligheid  -  Afrikaans  
for  White  Security.  There  had  been  hostility  between  the  Afrikaners  and  the  ANC,  mainly  
because  the  ANC  had  been  declared  a  terrorist  group  by  South  Africa's  government  and  were  
known  for  targeting  the  white  population  in  bombings,  and  other  killings.   The  Afrikaners  see  the  
ANC  as  a  group  that  wants  to  kill  all  the  whites,  and  the  ANC  views  the  Afrikaners  as  the  
oppressors.Unfortunately  this  source  of  vigilantism  has  its  consequences,  because  a  right  wing  
group  with  access  to  fire  power  means  that  in  their  crusade  to  defend  their  people,innocent  
people  get  hurt  in  the  crossfire,  such  as  Mnikelo  Ndamase,  who  was  killed  on  March  28,  1990  by  
members  of  Blanke  Veiligheid  after  they  found  him  shopping  in  a  white  neighborhood.  Yet  why  
do  people  flock  to  the  Blanke  Veiligheid?  The  answer:  protection.  People  want  to  feel  safe,  and  
they  will  be  willing  to  join  a  cause  just  to  feel  safe.  One  miner  joined  because  he  felt  threatened  
when  black  miners  were  painting  ANC  symbols  on  the  walls  of  the  mines,  he  claimed  that,  
'' Anyone  who  says  they're  not  scared  is  lying.  Sometimes  there  are  blacks  who  are  pushing  you  
and  you  can't  do  anything  about  it.''  Fear  driven  membership  is  what  forms  these  groups.  
Groups  like  these  have  become  so  prevalent  and  violent,  that  at  times  the  South  African  
government  doesn’t  have  the  resources  to  combat  them  or  protect  the  people.  One  solution  that  






South  Africa.  This  is  a  form  of  non-state  policing,  and  it  can  range  from  either  private  security  
contracts,  to  community  militias,  all  the  way  to  vigilante  groups.  There  is  just  one  problem  
though,  while  the  groups  will  be  monitored  by  the  police  in  South  Africa,  anyone  can  join,  which  
includes  the  ANC,  Blanke  Veiligheid,  Umkhonto  we  Sizwe  (translates  to  the  Spear  of  the  Nation,  
which  is  an  armed  faction  of  the  ANC),  and  the  racist  neo-nazi  Afrikaner  Weerstandsbeweging;  
and  to  top  it  all  off  the  order  is  that  these  groups  can’t  be  political.  This  already  presents  a  
problem.  Expecting  groups  who  have  radically  different  political  ideologies  to  work  together  in  
unison  is  just  a  recipe  for  disaster.  I  can’t  imagine  Nazis  and  the  ANC  working  together  to  stop  
crime,  their  ideologies  differ  on  so  many  levels.  While  it  is  good  that  these  groups  will  be  
monitored  by  the  police,  there’s  still  problems  that  can  arise.  For  one,  with  political  groups  
mixed  in  with  these  paramilitary  groups,  political  groups  could  potentially  recruit  more  members  
for  their  cause.  There’s  also  the  potential  that  groups  could  take  advantage  of  these  neighborhood  
watch  groups  to  see  where  opposing  groups  family  members  live  or  where  rival  members  live.  
So  by  day  they  act  like  the  neighborhood  watch  and  take  notes  on  what  the  area  is  like,  who  lives  
in  it,  and  the  day  to  day  life  of  the  people,   but  by  night  they  go  back  to  their  political  groups  and  
strike.  The  problem  with  putting  trust  into  vigilante  groups  is  that  everyone  has  a  different  
political  agenda  and  it  can  be  taken  advantage  of.  Also,  those  very  same  neighborhood  watch  
groups  can  become  a  big  problem  later  if  the  government  solely  relies  on  them.  
In  Cape  Town,  South  Africa,  a  group  known  as  People  Against  Gangsterism  and  Drugs  
(PAGAD)  had  enough  with  gang  violence  and  decided  to  do  something  about  it.  First  they  acted  
within  the  law,  staging  protests,  marches,  and  demonstrations  to  condemn  gang  violence  and  






communities,  and  their  slow  response  to  organized  crime.  However,  the  group  then  shifted  to  
more  violent  actions.  They  started  a  bombing  campaign  against  drug  dealers,  they  heavily  
publicized  their  assassinations  against  the  drug  lords;  in  just  2  years  they  had  killed  30  drug  
dealers  and  gang  leaders.  
There  was  the  expected  retaliations  against  innocents,  however  it  didn’t  deter  them  from  
their  attacks  against  the  gangs  which  they  heavily  decimated.  It  seemed  this  was  a  decent  group  
that  wanted  to  help  people.  They  only  started  fighting  back  because  they  had  had  enough  of  the  
violence.  They  believed  that  they  didn’t  have  to  work  within  the  law  if  the  police  were  not  going  
to  protect  them.  They  were  justified  in  their  attacks  if  it  meant  that  drug  dealing  scum  were  
wiped  off  the  street.   However,  this  group  later  became  a  threat.  They  started  shifting  their  
attacks  on  police  officers  and  police  stations  for  weapons,  they  also  attacked  stores  who  refused  
to  make  ‘donations’  for  their  cause.  On  top  of  that,  in  1998  they  adopted  anti-West  Islamist  
values  and  launched  bombing  campaigns  against  businesses  and  other  Capitalist  targets.  
Originally,  this  group  had  support  of  the  media,  businesses,  and  even  some  members  of  
the  government.  This  was  a  group  of  people  who  were  sick  of  being  pushed  around  by  criminals  
and  decided  to  do  something  about  it.  This  support  for  them  is  what  gave  them  a  positive  image,  
the  image  that  they  were  the  good  guys  who  only  wanted  to  help  people.  However,  once  they  
started  becoming  a  terrorist  group  all  that  support  disappeared.  That’s  the  problem  with  
supporting  vigilante  groups,  they  start  out  being  your  greatest  ally,  and  later  they  become  your  
worst  enemy.  Because  of  the  failure  of  the  police  department  to  do  anything  about  the  gangs,  it  
left  a  void  which  was  filled  by  vigilantism.  This  group  was  left  unchecked  simply  because  their  






turn  this  group  into  a  grave  danger  for  South  Africa’s  population.  What  originally  attracted  
recruits  was  it’s  message  of  fighting  gangs  and  people  flocked  to  that.  However,  it  later  became  a  
terrorist  group.  It  shows  why  people  join  these  groups,  and  why  it’s  never  a  good  idea  to  give  
these  groups  power.   
In  Columbia,  a  different  factor  drove  the  creation  of  paramilitary  groups:  a  power  
vacuum.  It  all  started  with  the  bloody  civil  war  between  Liberals  and  Conservatives  after  the  
killing  of  populist  Liberal  leader  on  April  9,  1948,  which  occurred  during  the  Inter  American  
Conference  in  Bogotá.  His  death  led  to  massive  rioting  in  the  streets,  prompting  Liberals  and  
Conservatives  to   hire  hitmen  called  pájaros  (birds)  who  would  eliminate  political  opponents  and  
cause  chaos  for  the  opposing  party.  These  men  were  the  stepping  stones  for  what  was  about  to  
come  for  Columbia.  
Finally,  the  civil  war  ended.  There  was  peace  between  the  Liberals  and  Conservatives,  
and  now  deals  and  compromises  could  be  made.  However,  one  group  got  left  out  of  the  
negotiations,  the  communists,  who  then  decided  that  the  only  way  to  achieve  representation  
politically  was  through  violence  and  thus:  the  Revolutionary  Armed  Forces  of  Colombia,  or  
FARC,  was  born.  Professional  assassins  were  the  stepping  stones  simply  because  they  operated  
like  them:  they  had  some  military  training  and  guns,  however  they  didn’t  work  for  the  
government.  Not  only  that,  but  they  could  get  away  with  all  the  killings,  since  they  had  no  badge  
at  all,  no  human  rights  group  could  hold  the  government  accountable.  The  politicians  were  able  
to  hire  their  own  deathsquads  to  take  care  of  business  and  not  have  to  worry  about  consequences,  






  The  FARC  formed  simply  because  they  had  their  own  set  of  grievances  and  they  
believed  they  knew  what  was  best  for  the  people.  While  there  was  a  treaty  between  the  Liberals  
and  Conservatives,  there  was  still  a  power  vacuum  that  needed  to  be  filled,  something  the  
government  couldn’t  do.  They  were  left  out  of  the  negotiations,  so  the  only  way  they  would  be  
able  to  represent  themselves  was  by  force.  However,  there  was  another  factor  as  well  that  caused  
the  ranks  of  the  FARC  to  swell.  Since  the  1920’s,  the  Texas  Petroleum  Company  had  been  a  
dominant  player  in  Columbia  and  had  rubbed  unions  and  Liberals  the  wrong  way.  Many  settlers  
despised  the  company  because  in  the  1950s  and  60s,  the  company  began  taking  land  from  
vulnerable  and  defenseless  settlers  by  forcing  them  to  either  sell  the  land  for  less  than  what  it  
was  worth,  or  use  violence  to  forcibly  remove  the  people.  In  response  to  this  violence,   people  
started   taking  the  very  weapons  that  were  used  to  oppress  them  and  turning  them  on  the  
oppressors.  The  FARC  swelled  in  numbers,  and  it  also  led  to  other  Liberal  guerilla  groups  
forming  as  well.  These  groups  targeted  oil  company,  ranchers  and  businessmen  as  the  enemy  of  
the  people  who  needed  to  be  dealt  with.   
Unfortunately,  there’s  always  a  consequence  for  one’s  actions.  The  FARC’s  attacks  left  
another  power  vacuum  in  the  country.  One  that  the   Colombian  government  couldn’t  fill  simply  
because  they  didn’t  have  the  resources  to  put  an  end  to  the  FARC  extortion.  Their  absence  was  
leaving  a  huge  power  vacuum  that  needed  to  be  filled,  and  the  people  who  were  going  to  fill  that  
vacuum  were  going  to  make  Columbia  a  little  more  bloody.  To  fight  the  communists  and  protect  
themselves  from  further  Communist  attacks,  some  villages,  towns,  and  even  some  ranchers  
decided  to  form  their  own  paramilitary  groups  to  counter  the  threat:  United  Self  Defense  Forces  






In  Columbia,  the  U.S  actually  helped  the  government  create  and  fund   paramilitary  
groups,  this  was  in  response  to  all  the  disorder  in  the  country.  The  U.S  and  Colombian  
governments  launched  Plan  Lazo  which  listed  the  goals  paramilitary  groups  had  to  perform:  first  
they  had  to  combat  enemy  insurgents  and  second,  they  had  to  monitor  and  gather  intelligence  on  
the  rebels,  their  civilian  supporters,  and  social  organizations  by  establishing  networks  throughout  
the  country.  The  U.S  and  Colombian  forces  also  supplied  the  groups  with  weapons  so  that  way  
they  could  fight  effectively.   The  support  of  the  U.S  is  what  formed  paramilitary  groups,  U.S  aid  
is  a  powerful  item  to  have,  they  pay  for  the  guns  and  they  provide  the  funding.  However,  the  job  
of  keeping  the  groups  in  line  falls  onto  the  country,  not  the  U.S.  So  if  one  group  gets  a  little  too  
powerful,  it’s  out  of  the  U.S’s  hands,  it’s  now  the  country’s  problem.   
It’s  not  uncommon  for  governments  to  ally  themselves  with  militias  or  other  groups  in  
war,  they  can  provide  valuable  intel  and  fighting.  Also,  it  helps  free  up  government  resources  
that  can  be  used  against  a  certain  area  where  there’s  a  higher  concentration  of  rebels.  The  
paramilitary  groups  deal  with  the  threats  that  the  government  can’t  spare  the  resources  for.  
However  when  there’s  collusion,  the  government  always  lays  out  the  ground  rules  for  the  
groups:  such  as  obeying  the  rules  of  war,  and  trying  to  minimize  the  amount  of  human  rights  
violations.  However,  at  times,  the  government  simply  allows  paramilitary  groups  to  do  whatever  
they  want.  This  is  the  case  for  the  United  Self  Defense  Forces  of  Columbia  (the  AUC).  This  was  
a  right  wing  paramilitary  group  that  formed  up  to  fight  the  FARC  and  other  leftist  groups.  It  was  
created  by  the  Castaño  brothers  after  their  wealthy  father  was  kidnapped  and  killed  by  FARC  
guerrillas,  which  fueled  their  personal  war  against  the  FARC.  When  the  AUC  fought  the  FARC,  






due  to  their  intense  hatred  of  the  FARC.  Whenever  they  entered  a  territory  formerly  controlled  
by  the  FARC,  they  decided  to  set  an  example.  This  led  to  the  practice  of  limpieza,  where  a  town  
is  massacred  and  attacked  for  being  a  “guerrilla  nest”(pueblo  guerrillero)  .   This  practice  is  how  
the  AUC  from  1997  to  1999  was  able  to  kill  19,000  people  who  were  suspected  of  sympathising  
with  guerrillas.  This  was  a  way  to  instil  fear  into  the  people,  to  discourage  them  from  helping  the  
other  groups  or  else  they  would  be  shot.  Because  of  their  hatred  of  leftists,  they  were  also  paid  by  
companies  to  assassinate  union  organizers  as  well.  Coca  Cola  and  the  Chiquita  Banana  Company  
paid  the  AUC  to  be  their  own  personal  death  squad  to  take  care  of  union  organizers.    This  
demonstrates  a  problem  if  a  group  with  a  lot  of  power  like  the  AUC  isn’t  kept  in  check,  they  will 
keep  killing  to  get  the  job  done  and  it  gets  very  difficult  to  stop  them.   
With  these  violations,  you  think  the  Colombian  government  would  instantly  clamp  down  
in  this  activity  and  put  a  stop  to  it,  though  it’s  a  little  more  complicated  than  it  seems.  The  AUC  
was  fighting  not  only  against  the  leftists,  but  Pablo  Escobar,  Columbia's  most  feared  drug  lord  as  
well.  The  AUC  had  formed  a  splinter  group  known  as  ‘Los  Pepes’  (people  persecuted  by  Pablo  
Escobar)and  it  had  the  backing  of  rival  cartels  and  police  officers.  The  government  needed  them  
to  keep  up  the  pressure  on  the  FARC  and  Pablo  Escobar  as  well  because  simply  they  were  
overwhelmed.  They  were  trying  to  fight  Escobar  and  other  drug  lords  in  one  area,  and  leftists  
guerillas  in  another  area,  so  the  AUC  and  their  splinter  group  was  seen  as  necessary  so  
government  forces  wouldn’t  be  stretched  thin.  This  is  the  problem  with  tolerating  paramilitary  
groups,  it  doesn't  keep  them  in  check  and  they  continue  a  reign  of  terror  on  the  population.  As  
long  as  they  attacked  the  FARC,  they  were  safe  from  government  retaliation.  Whereas  when  the  






The  FARC  had  to  deal  with  self  defense  groups  before,  however  another  paramilitary  
group  that  was  well  funded  and  known  for  brutality  was  not  what  they  had  in  mind.  It  shows  that  
if  one  paramilitary  group  forms,  chances  are  another  forms  in  response  to  that  groups  actions.  
These  groups  will  then  compete  to  attract  more  people  to  help  their  cause,  and  the  government  is  
just  powerless  to  stop  them.  It  creates  an  endless  cycle  of  groups  being  formed,  and  a  never  
ending  cycle  of  violence.   
The  problem  with  also  tolerating  the  AUC  was  their  habit  of  kidnapping  and  torture.  
While  other  guerilla  groups  did  things  like  this,  when  it’s  a  group  the  government  is  tolerating,  
then  problems  start  to  arise.  In  the  town  of  San  Carlos  on  October  27,  1998,  200  members  of  the  
AUC  arrived  and  started  setting  up  roadblocks,  and  frisked  1,000  people.   Then,  it  turned  violent;  
several  local  village  leaders  were  accused  of  supporting  guerrillas,  and  they  were  beheaded  on  
the  spot,  bodies  left  for  everyone  to  see.  The  violence  didn’t  stop  there  though,  they  went  from  
house  to  house  with  a  list  of  potential  suspected  sympathizers  and  killed  them.  However,  no  one  
would  stop  them,  the  AUC  was  too  powerful,  and  nobody  wanted  to  cross  them.   
The  problem  with  tolerating  this  type  of  violence  is  it  sets  off  a  chain  of  events,  it  makes  
it  seem  as  though  everyone  can  get  away  with  killing,  as  long  as  who  you  are  killing  is  an  enemy  
of  the  government.  In  the  Columbian  cities  of   Medellin,  Cali  and  others,  death  squads  started  
popping  up  not  only  wiping  out  drug  dealers,  but  petty  thieves  and  prostitutes  as  well;  even  more  
shocking  was  that  off  duty  police  officers  were  a  part  of  these  death  squads.   There’s  a  big  
problem  if  off  duty  officers  are  joining  death  squads,  it  means  they  are  violating  the  rules  police  
officers  and  not  setting  an  example  for  the  people.  If  they  were  in  uniform,  violating  those  results  






not  in  uniform,  and  a  part  of  a  death  squad  makes  it  ok,  because  they  aren’t  representing  the  
government  at  the  moment,  it’s  only  them  since  they  feel  that  the  law  is  holding  them  back.   The  
AUC  had  caused  several  problems  for  the  Colombian  government  later  in  life,  they  interfered  
with  peace  talks  between  the  government  and  the  FARC  and  on  top  of  it,  they  got  involved  with  
the  drug  trade  (though  they  did  do  a  purge  to  get  rid  of  those  associated  with  the  drug  trade).  This  
is  what  later  caused  the  government  to  go  on  the  offensive  against  the  AUC  to  put  a  stop  to  them.  
We  see  how  paramilitary  groups  are  effective  at  fighting,  and  how  they  rise.  It's  
understandable  about  why  people  join  them  and  why  governments  sometimes  tolerate  certain  
groups.These  groups  can  get  their  hands  as  dirty  as  they  want,  and  it  won’t  be  tied  to  the  
government  at  all.  War  is  tough  and  people  have  interests.  There  is  a  price  that  is  paid  though  
because  of  their  tolerance  towards  such  groups.  They  can  start  out  as  a  group  that  wants  to  help,  
but  end  up  becoming  a  terrorist  group.  They  are  seen  as  a  necessary  evil,  but  then  what  happens  
when  that  evil  becomes  a  problem?  It  shows  what  happens  when  there’s  a  power  vacuum  in  
society  and  government  forces  can’t  fill  it.  A  government’s  failure  to  respond  quickly  or  help,  
will  lead  to  another  group  to  fill  the  void.  It’s  important  for  governments  to  protect  their  people  
so  that  way  no  vigilante  groups  will  form.  This  is  what  happened  in  South  Africa  with  PAGAD,  
who  went  from  vigilante  group  to  full  on  terrorist  group.   It’s  also  critical  that  they  avoid  power  
vacuums  in  areas.  If  they  don’t  have  a  presence  in  an  area  or  aren’t  strong  enough  to  stop  chaos,  
ideological  groups  will  seize  the  opportunity  to  gain  an  influence  over  the  people  in  that  vacuum  
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